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NEW MEXICO'S BAR RESIDENCY AS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PENALTY ON APPLICANT'S
RIGHT TO TRAVEL-A PROJECTED
REVERSAL OF SUFFLING v. BONDURANT
339 F. SUPP. 257 (D.N.M. 1972).
Any state has an understandably great concern in maintaining the
fairness and efficiency of its judicial system. Insuring that only high
caliber attorneys practice within its territory is a partial solution.' A
state is empowered to impose certain bar admission prerequisites
which commonly screen applicants for three qualities: knowledge of
the law, moral character, and residency.2 Although residency bears a
questionable relationship to the state's legitimate interest in insuring
the admission of only high caliber applicants, 45 of the 51 jurisdictions have some type of residence requirement.3 New Mexico's rule
requires that an unlicensed candidate reside in the state for six
months, commencing no later than the date of the bar examination.4
Recently, in the case of Suffling v. Bondurants the constitutionality of this rule was challenged-particularly in its postexamination application. Plaintiffs alleged that a durational residence
rule creates two classes of bar candidates: one class which is allowed
to practice law after passing the bar examination; the other class
which, after passing the same examination, is prohibited from prac1. In Florida State Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla. 1962) the Florida Supreme
Court gave the proper reason for regulating the practice of law:
The reason for prohibiting the practice of law by those who have not been
examined and found qualified is frequently misunderstood. It is not done to
aid or protect the members of the legal profession either in creating or maintaining a monopoly or closed shop. It is done to protect the public from being
advised and represented in legal matters by unqualified persons....
See generally, Dalton & Williamson, State BarriersAgainst Migrant Lawyers, 25 U. Kan. City
L Rev. 144 (1957); Bard & Bamford, The Bar: ProfessionalAssociation or Medieval Guild
19 Catholic U.L. Rev. 393 (1970); Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 1711 (1967); Note, Restrictions on Admissions to the Bar: By-Product of
Federalism, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 710 (1950); Note, Residence Requirements for Initial Admission to the Bar: A Compromise Proposal for Change: 56 Cornell L. Rev. 831 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as Residence).
2. See Residence, supra note 1, at 833.
3. The National Conference of Bar Examiners, The Bar Examiners' Handbook 15 (1968).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule II.A.8 (1953):
An applicant for admission to the Bar upon examination, except an attorney
duly admitted to the Bar in another state and actually engaged in the practice
of law therein, must be an actual bonafide resident of the State of New
Mexico at the time of examination. An applicant for admission to the
Bar... must be a citizen of the United States, an actual bona-fide resident of
the State of New Mexico for at least six months prior to admission, 21 years
of age and of good moral character....
5. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M. 1972).
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ticing pending completion of a six-months' residence. Such a classification does not reasonably serve the state's legitimate interest of
character investigation. This investigation is commenced no later
than the deadline for registration-50 to 90 days before the examination is given. 6 By the time of the examination, the Board of Bar
Examiners has usually been able to review all the out-of-state data
and material available, 7 and the remaining residency period becomes
arbitrary for its lack of purpose.
At the time the suit was filed, plaintiffs Suffling, Fayhe and inter8
venor Schmidt were residents of New Mexico, and recent graduates
9
of A.B.A. accredited law schools. They had taken and passed the
August, 1971 bar exam.
The essence of their claim was that Rule II(A)(8) violated the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause as tested by two
standards: the traditional standard of proving a "rationally connected" state interest set out in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners"0; and the more stringent test announced in Shapiro v.
of proving a "compelling state interest" since the
Thompson'
of interstate movement was being penalized.
freedom
fundamental
The action was brought as a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of Rule II(A)(8).
Within the fourteen months prior to the convocation of this three
judge panel, four others had been convened to rule on similar pro6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule I1.B.15 (1953).
7. See Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule ll.A.8 (1953). Plaintiff Rose was not a resident at the
time the suit was filed. He had taken the bar exam in August, 1970, claiming New Mexico
residency. The court, however, found this claim "impermissible" because Rose was already a
resident of California when he had graduated from Loyola Law School several months
before. He was still a California resident one week later when he took and passed the
California Bar exam.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule II.A.9 (1953). Schmidt was a resident and inhabitant
of New Mexico until 1968 when he graduated from the University of New Mexico Law
School. Before taking the New Mexico Bar exam, however, he became a California resident.
He took the New Mexico Bar exam for the first time in August, 1971, as a California
resident.
10. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957):
A state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any
qualification must have a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or
capacity to practice law.
11. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969):
At the outset, we reject the appellant's argument that a mere showing of a
rational relationship between the waiting period and... admittedly per[I]n
missible state objectives will suffice to justify the classification ....
moving from State to State ... appellees were exercising a constitutional right,
and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless
shown to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

visions.' 2 These courts uniformly concluded that the pre-condition
of bar residency was violative of the equal protection clause.' 3 The
Suffling court was the fifth panel to entertain the challenge.
Held: Shapiro 's compelling interest standard was inapplicable to
the facts before the court; and using the traditional test, that residency of six months "to be commenced either any time before the
bar examination or as late as the day of the bar examination is a
reasonable period in which to afford the Board of Bar Examiners an
opportunity to investigate the morals and character of those persons
who seek to become members of the New Mexico Bar."'1 4
A strong dissent by Judge Bratton focused on the objection that
any residency period required after the bar examination was "not
contemplated by the Board's own rules for the purpose of evaluation
of character." '
Hence, new residents were being denied equal
protection measured by the traditional standard. He made no objection, however, to the majority's decision not to apply the Shapiro
standard.
Plaintiffs have appealed to the United States Supreme Court.' 6
The purpose of this note is twofold: (1) to predict a reversal of
Suffling in light of Dunn v. Blumstein,' 7 the Supreme Court's most
12. North Carolina's rule required one year of residence before a candidate was allowed
to take the bar examination which was given but once a year. The candidate could be
required to reside in state for two years before being allowed to practice under such a rule.
Under both the traditional and the compelling interest tests this rule was held to be violative
of the Equal Protection Clause. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D.N.C. 1970).
Georgia's statute required no residence qualification for the examination if the candidate
graduated from an American Bar Association approved law school. Before being admitted to
the bar a residence of one year was required. This pre-admission statute could result in a
post-examination residence requirement similar to that required by New Mexico's Rule
II.A.8. The one-year statutory residence requirement was held to violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection only on the traditional ground. Webster v. Wofford, 321 F.
Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
Mississippi's rule required one year of residence before a candidate was allowed to apply
for examination. In that there was also a 90-day deadline for receiving applications prior to
the exam, the rule's effect was a 15-month residency requirement. The court held that the
strict Shapiro test should not be applied, and the rule was stricken for denying the traditional standard of equal protection. Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss.

1971).
Hawaii's rule required residence of six months after the candidate's fifteenth birthday.
Co-existent with this rule was a sixty-day registration period prior to the bar exam for the
express purpose of educational and character verification. The six-month rule was held
unconstitutional only by the traditional rational connection standard. Potts v. Honorable
Justices of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971).
13. Only Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970) held
that the Shapiro strict test was applicable. The other courts relied exclusively on the traditional standard.
14. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972).
15. Id at 261 (dissenting opinion).
16. Notice of Appeal filed May 12, 1972.
17. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).
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recent ruling on the validity of residence requirements; and (2) to
offer the Board of Bar Examiners a durational residence requirement
which will be a constitutionally valid professional licensing measure.
SUFFLING V. BONDURANT WILL BE REVERSED
ON APPEAL
It is unclear from the language and findings whether the court did
not apply the strict compelling interest test, or whether, after improperly applying it, the court found that Rule II(A)(8) satisfied this
more stringent standard.
A. The Strict Test was not Applied
Some of the court's language expresses a categorical and absolute
refusal to apply Shapiro:
Shapiro held that the classification created by the imposition of a
one-year waiting period for welfare benefits did not promote a compelling state interest and was unconstitutional. The holding of
Shapiro is not applicable here however, as that case specifically excludes persons seeking professional licenses. (Emphasis added.) "
Further, the majority emphatically "reject[s] application of the
stricter test of Equal Protection in this case.. .",' I and more sig20
the court
nificantly it cites the case of Lipinan v. Van Zant, where
2
unambiguously refused to apply the Shapiro standard.
22
Apparently, the Suffling court accepted defendants' arguments
that the right to travel announced in Shapiro was limited as a matter
of law to Shapiro's facts because of the Supreme Court's statement
therein:
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence

requirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuitionfree education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or
fish, etc. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests
upon the
on the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties
23
travel.
interstate
exercise of the constitutional right of

Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.M. 1972).
Id at 260.
Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
Id at 403-04:
The Shapiro court... had no occasion to apply the more stringent standard to
eligibility requirements for obtaining a license to practice a profession, and
expressly pretermitted the question. In view of the Supreme Court's continuing reliance on Schware's standards in late bar admission cases, we deem
the rational test to be the only one applicable, and that it would be incorrect
to judge any aspect of this case in terms of the stricter standard....
22. Memorandum Brief for Defendants at 3, 4, Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257
(D.N.M. 1972).
23. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 at n. 21 (1969).
18.
19.
20.
21.
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Since Shapiro, however, the Supreme Court has ruled on the
validity of residence requirements in some of these "specifically excluded" areas. Dunn v. Blumstein,2 4 its most recent decision, deals
with voting residency as an unconstitutional penalty on freedom to
move interstate.
James Blumstein, a native of New York, moved to Nashville in
June, 1970, to join the faculty of Vanderbilt Law School. Almost
immediately upon arrival, he registered to vote in the up-coming
August and November elections. The voting officials refused to
register him since Tennessee required residency in the State for one
year and in the county for three months as prerequisites for voting
registration. Tennessee asserted that the durational residence requirements were needed to insure a knowledgeable vote and the "purity
of the ballot box."
Held: The requirements were violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment as tested by the Shapiro
standard.
For a fair comparison, the distinctions between Blumstein and
Suffling must be noted. First, the state interests to be protected were
different. Arguably, Tennessee may protect itself from fraudulent
dual-voting in less time than New Mexico could screen and investigate would-be officers of its courts. Second, the nature of the personal rights penalized was different. Blumstein found that not only
was the right to move interstate impaired, but also that the fundamental first amendment right to vote was denied. Suffling involved
the penalizing of only the right to travel, the right to work being
protected only generally under the equal protection or due process
clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 2 5 Third, Blumstein makes
numerous references to the 1970 Federal Voting Rights Act, 2 in
which Congress outlawed state durational residence requirements for
presidential and vice-presidential elections. In Suffling, there is no
such undertone of federal intervention.
Despite these distinctions, the type of classification challengeddiscrimination by durational residency-is identical, and Blumstein
unequivocally rules that ". . . durational residence laws must be
measured by a strict equal protection test."'" Further, as noted by
Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, "much of the opinion
seems to be couched in absolute terms" indicating that the majority
24. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).

25. Cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914);
Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1362 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
26. Federal Voting Rights Act, § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 aa-1 (1970).

27. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4273 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).
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had "taken a position broader than ... necessary for the disposition

of this case." 2 I
Suffling refused to apply the strict test because Shapiro
"specifically excluded" its application to professional licensing. However, as for the simultaneously excluded requirement for voting,
Blumstein held to the contrary.
Although in Shapiro we specifically did not decide whether durational residence requirements could be used to determine voting
eligibility, we concluded that since the right to travel was a constitutionally protected right, "any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling state interest, is unconstitutional."... Shapiro and the

compelling state 29interest test as articulated control this case.
(Emphasis added.)

B. The Strict Test was Improperly Applied
Despite the court's explicit rejection of Shapiro's strict test, the
opinion contains language which indicates an attempted application:
Considered under the traditional test of reasonable classification
which is the standard we hold applicable, the six-month residency is
reasonable and does not unduly penalize petitioner's right to interstate travel While rejecting application of the stricter test of Equal
Protection in this case, Lipman v. Van.Zant, we express the view
that a state does have a compelling interest in the quality and
integrity of the persons whom it licenses to practice law and may
impose3 0 regulations which promote that interest. (Emphasis
added.)
If the court did not apply Shapiro, then its recitation of Shapiro
test findings is dictum-not only irrelevant but confusing. Conceding,
from the mere existence within the opinion of the key words"absence of penalty" and "presence of compelling state interest"that the strict test was applied, the results were erroneous due to
improper application.
The Shapiro test requires, as a prerequisite for finding a statute
constitutional, a finding of no penalty on interstate movement, or
that such penalty is justified by being necessary to promote a compelling state interest. It is at the first stage of analysis-determination
of no penalty-that the Suffling court commits its most serious error.
It concluded that the six-month residency requirement does not
28. Id at 4279.
29. Id at 4272.
30. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

"unduly penalize" the right of interstate movement. Use of the word
"unduly" indicates faulty reasoning. A "penalty" arises from the
simple act of discriminatory or unequal treatment. It is not
mysteriously set in motion by a defined quantum of impingement. 3 1
Blumstein is directly in point and clarifies the law:
In Tennessee's view, the compelling state interest test is appropriate
only where there is "some evidence to indicate a deterrence of or
infringement on the right to travel.. ." . . . In essence, Tennessee
argues that the right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally relevant sense. This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law.... Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that
denial of welfare actually deterred travel.... In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling state interest test would be triggered by "any classification which served 3to2 penalize the exercise of
the right [to travel] ... (Emphasis added.)
Areas of the Suffling opinion which point to this improper
balancing of the actual deterring effect of Rule II(A)(8) include:
None of the cases in which residency requirements have been held
unconstitutional
deals with requirements as liberal as those of New
33
Mexico.
And, more blatantly:
All of the Petitioners except Rose have been gainfully employed in
New Mexico since having passed the bar examination in positions
requiring legal training although not as admitted lawyers. None have
undergone any economic hardship since passing the bar examination,
although Suffling, Fayhe and Schmidt could have earned more as
members of the New Mexico Bar.3 4
Suffling held the durational residence requirement did not
penalize interstate movement. Proper analysis would have yielded
results similar to the following:
... [D] urational residence laws classify bona fide residents on the
basis of recent travel, penalizing those persons, and only those persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another during the
qualifying period. Thus, the durational residence requirement
on the exercise of a... fundamental right, the
directly impinges
3
right to travel. 5
The Suffling court's additional finding "that a state does have a
31. Id., Brief for the Legl Aid Society of Albuquerque and the New Mexico Chapter of
the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae at 6, 7.
32. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4272-73 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).

33. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.M. 1972).
34. Id. at 258.
35. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4272 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).
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compelling interest in the quality and integrity of the attorneys it
licenses",3 6 is at best superfluous. State justification can be found
either from a determination of "no penalty on travel" or from a
finding that the requirement "furthers a compelling state interest." A
finding of both indicates distorted reasoning.
Also indicative of the court's uncertainty in applying Shapiro's
standard is its recitation of the test. 3 ' It omits the key words "is
necessary to" promote that compelling interest. Those words are the
crucial limitations on the state's regulatory power, requiring the state
to choose the least onerous alternative in promoting its legitmate
purpose. Such a view of the law-that a compelling interest without
the added mandate that the state's law which promotes the interest
be very narrowly designed-is in error.
The Suffling court's dilemma is clear. If the stringent test was not
applied, as some of its opinion states, or if it was applied improperly,
is indicated by other language, reversible error was committed.
glumstein all but dictates that Rule II(A)(8) is to be measured by
Shapiro:
In sum, durational residence laws must be measured by a strict equal

protection test: they are unconstitutional unless the State can

demonstrate that such laws are "necessary to promote a compelling
governmental interest." 38

. The Parties'Positionsand the Court's Holding
Judge Bratton clearly adopts the Plaintiffs' position, concisely
tated in his dissent.
By the terms of Rule II(AX10), 3 9 the Board is required to find an
applicant to be of good moral character prior to the applicant being
allowed to take the bar examination. In the face of this rule, the
Board's contention that it is necessary to evaluate a non-resident
applicant's character by a residency after the examination is untenable. 4 o
... The evidence in this case was that in actual practice the Board
had no procedure for affirmative action or evaluation by it of applicants during the post-examination residency period, relying
instead on the attorney certificates required by Rule VI(38), and on

36.
37.
38.
39.

Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972).
Id
Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.LW. 4269, 4273 (U.S. Max. 21, 1972).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule II.A.10 (1953):
The Board of Bar Examiners shall not permit any applicant to take an
examination ... unless such applicant shall satisfy the Board of his good moral
character.
40. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 261 (D.N.M. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
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information which might be volunteered to it. There was no
evidence that anyone had ever actually been denied admission at the
end of such period on the ground of moral character. 4
The Defendants argued that the six-month residency requirement
was a reasonable measure for insuring the quality and integrity of
new lawyers:
.

.. [R] eports especially on practicing attorneys are often not re-

ceived until after [the bar] examination has been held. As to former
non-resident law school graduates, available information is sufficiently sparse that the waiting period is particularly valuable in
affording an opportunity for the public in the state to observe the
conduct and character of an applicant, and to communicate to the
Board of Bar Examiners any character deficiencies thus observed.

(Emphasis added.)4 2
The court accepted Defendants' arguments and concluded that
Rule II(A)(8)'s six-month residency requirement was constitutional in
that it reasonably serves two legitimate state functions. It "afford[s]
the Board of Bar Examiners an opportunity to investigate the morals
and character" of the candidates, and "also provides a realistic time
period in which three members of the bar residing in applicant's
locality can certify regarding his moral character as required by Rule
VI(38)."4 3
The court avoided Judge Bratton's argument-that the rule of a
post-examination residence for a character evaluation was patently
invalid-by what appears to be a restatement of the Plaintiffs' challenge of arbitrary and unreasonable classification:
While the regulations require that residence and good moral character be established before taking the bar examination, the Commis-

sioners have allowed the residence period to be filled out after the
[to] be established after
examination ...and good moral character
44
the examination. (Emphasis added.)

The meaning of this language is unclear. The court appears to have
disposed of Judge Bratton's argument by circumvention.
41. Id at n. 3, dissenting opinion.
42. Id., Memorandum Brief for Defendants at 21.
43. Id. at 6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule VI.38 (1953) provides:
No applicant will be recommended for license until he has completed the
period of 6 months actual bona-fide residence in the State nor until he has
submitted certificates of three members of the Bar of New Mexico residing in
the locality where applicant lives that applicant has maintained his residence in
this state for the period of 6 months preceding and that he is a person of good
moral character....
44. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D.N.M. 1972).
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D. Results of a t-oper Application of Shapiro'sStrict Test
Had Shapiro been properly applied, Rule II(A)(8) would have
been more closely scrutinized:
It is not sufficient for the State to show that durational residence
requirements further a very substantial state interest. In pursuing
that important interest, the State cannot choose means which unnecessarily burden or restrict constitutionally protected activity.
Statutes affecting constitutional rights must be drawn with "precision"

. . .

and must be "tailored"

to serve their legitimate objec.

tives... [I] f there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals
with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State
interference. If it acts at all, it
may not choose the way of greater
45
must choose "less drastic means."
The post-examination restriction imposed on the right to travel by
Rule II(A)(8) is not necessary to provide the Board of Bar Examiners

an opportunity to investigate the applicant's character, the evidence
revealing that the Board has no procedure for affirmative action
during this period and that no candidate has ever been denied admission when the period terminated. 4 6

Receiving certifications as to good moral character as provided by
Rule VI(38) appears to be the only investigating the Board does after
the bar examination. Even if such a community observation and
reporting device is found to be a reasonable measure as an investigative aid to the Board, can it be argued that such a rule is necessary-that there are no "other, reasonable ways to achieve" the
Board's evaluation of the candidate? The late Dean Horack faced this
question:
Of course the reason given for a period of residence prior to admission is that it will thus prevent an unknown lawyer of bad moral or
professional character from gaining admission, because during this
period he will have an opportunity to establish his good moral
character where he will be under the observation of local people.
Practically this is of little or no protection to the state and the bar.
A mere year of residence does not go far to establish a man's character and only careful investigation at the applicant'sformer place of
residence is apt to disclose those habits or qualities which would
make him an undesirable member of the local bar.4 7
In an increasingly urban and mobile society, the state's assertion
45. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4273 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).
46. See Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972) (dissenting
opinion).
47. Horack, "Trade Barriers" to BarAdmission, 28 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 102-03 (1944).
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that community observation is a necessary screening device is
unacceptable.
Under Shapiro's standards it is incumbent upon New Mexico to
show more than that the six-month durational residency requirement
of Rule II(A)(8) is "reasonably connected" to a governmental goal.
It must show that simpler or more direct ways to the same result, less
burdensome on the applicant's right to travel, are not available. Less
onerous alternatives exist, even within the present Rules for Bar
Examiners: Rule II(B)(l 3) requires pre-examination application to
be accompanied by a local attorney's certification that the applicant
is of good moral character; Rule II(B)(1 5) sets the application deadline at 90 days before the examination, or 50 days for applicants
graduating from A.B.A. approved law schools. Investigation as a
practical matter starts on receipt of an application. This period is
sufficient to check character qualification. 48 Numerous other provisions exist within the Rules for a more efficient, less taxing
morality investigation.' 9
Durational residency to be completed from the date of examination to six months thereafter is not a necessary means of achieving
the governmental goal of investigating and evaluating an applicant's
character. There exist alternative means to that end proven to be less
restrictive on the applicant's fundamental freedom to move interstate.
PROPOSALS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE RULE
If as projected, New Mexico's Rule II(A)(8) is unconstitutional,
what alternatives are available?
A. Absolute Abolition of any Residence Requirements
The most obvious, least painstaking alternative is to dispense with
the residency requirement. The six jurisdictions which have done so
investigate entirely by out-of-state communication with the National
48. Cf. Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1361 (E.D.N.C. 1970):
The plaintiffs concede, and we agree, that some reasonable period of time may
be necessary to delve into the character qualifications of all applicants set
sufficiently before the examination. If the Board be concerned that out-ofstate applicants may not fully cooperate in the determination of their fitness,
reasonable cooperation can be assured by requiring it for admission.
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 18-1-8, Rule II1. 23 (1953) provides that "administrative machinery shall be set up where applicant's questionnaires or interviews warranted." Rle 111.23 also
requires the Board to use the investigatory services of the National Conference of Bar
Examiners. These services are nationwide and thorough enough to be exclusively relied on
for accurate and responsible character checks; Rule IV. 26 provides for individual notification and further meetings concerning particular applicants. Such a rule would be useful in
the rare instances where investigation has not been completed before the bar examination.
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Conference of Bar Examiners" 0 which conducts a thorough, nationwide check with particular emphasis on the candidate's old residences.
B. Pre-ExaminationResidency
Another view is that a state, responsible for its public's protection,
is bound to police those it accepts as bar members by more "human"
devices than an out-of-state law school record, a computer processed
punchcard account of his disciplinary and criminal records, and the
results of a three day standardized bar examination. Arguably, a
required waiting-period of sustained personal contact and observation reveals character flaws and screens unprofessional conduct not
traceable through "paper" evaluation.
Justice Blackmun appears to sanction this view:
...The State, in granting the authority to practice law, with what
surely is the true privilege, not the right, to -be entrusted with a
client's confidences, aspirations, freedom, life itself, property, and
the very means of livelihood, demands something more of the
applicant than a formal certificate of completion of a course of legal
study and the ability acceptably to answer a series of questions on a
Bar examination. It presumably demands what fundamentally is
character. And it is character which a State holds out to the public
when it authorizes an applicant to practice law. s '
A state may insist that the attorneys it licenses be bona fide resiJents, not only at the time they are admitted, but for a reasonble
period beforehand, "according to [the state] a chance to conduct in
-ach case a meaningful and careful investigation ...into the
-haracter of a bar applicant.... " 2
At present, New Mexico relies almost exclusively on out-of-state
'entralized character sources.5 3 The required in-state waiting period
is a character screen is effectively dormant and in this dormancy,
.articularly its post-examination phase, lies its constitutional defect.
f the four residency requirements previously challenged in federal
ourts, only Georgia's was similar to New Mexico's in this post-xamination aspect. In that case, Webster v. Wofford," 4 the requirenent was stricken for precisely this defect as being violative of tradiional equal protection:
50. The National Conference of Bar Examiners, The Bar Examiners' Handbook 79-90
1968).
51. Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 20 (1971).
52. Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 402-03 (N.D. Miss. 1971).
53. See Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M. 1972) (dissenting
pinion).
54. Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
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Having established residency and taken the bar examination, the
applicant is not required to physically remain in Georgia prior to the
fulfillment of his residency requirement. Having become a
permanent resident he may sojourn elsewhere. The situation might
be different if applicant's acts or achievements in the interim were
under investigation or in some constructive fashion were made a
condition of his ultimate admission. All investigations into his background, moral character, etc., are completed and reviewed however,
prior to the bar examination. The statute as drawn therefore serves
absolutely no purpose save delay. Indeed, so far as appears, the
applicant could remain in a self-induced coma for the entire period
and still demand admission at the appointed time. (Emphasis
added.)5 s
To provide the missing constitutional link of purpose to period,
New Mexico could amend its rule to require residency on application
date, or to require a 90-day pre-examination residency. Lipman v.
Van Zant expressly upheld the length and structure of such a residency law. 5" Adoption of this proposal, however, would sacrifice
the present rule's commendable facility for interstate movement-its
"minimal risk" quality.
Under the present regulation, an out-of-state resident, graduating
from law school, may take the bar examination in August or March,
establishing his residency the day before or even the day of the
examination. By the fifth day after he has arrived and established
residency, he knows if he has passed the examination,' ' and if he
has "cleared" the National Conference character check.
C. Post-examinationResidency
A third alternative which will retain the "minimal risk" feature of
the present rule, and simultaneously supply and equate state purpose
to residence period, is to require a post-examination durational residency.' 8 The proposed rule would provide that all applicants for bar
admission must complete a six-month residency in probationary
practice as "conditional licensees." By the time the bar examination
has been graded, most applicants are minimally fit and capable to
55. Id at 1261-62.
56. Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 402-03 (N.D. Miss. 1971):
Thus a requirement of residence at date of application does not force any
citizen to become a Mississippi resident for a period of time very little more
than three months prior to his taking the examination. These are, without
doubt, reasonable requirements....
57. Memorandum Brief for Defendants at 6, Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257
(D.N.M. 1972):
Results of New Mexico Bar examinations are released on the first or second
day following completion of the bar examination by the applicant.
58. See Residence, supra note 1.
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practice law. At this time the State would admit all passing
applicants to the New Mexico Bar on a conditional basis. Although
the probationary license would entitle the applicant to counsel
clients, litigate cases and charge payment for his services according to
the minimum fee scale, there would be limitations and regulatory
measures imposed by such a rule. The three attorneys who presently
are required to certify as to the six-month residence and good moral
character of the applicant [Rule VI(38)] under the modified rule
would be appointed by the Board of Bar Examiners to fill a much
more active role as the licensee's "sponsors." Their function would
be to observe the licensee on the job, as advocate, counsellor and
legal advisor, and to keep the Board advised of his work by periodic,
informal reports. During this period of probationary practice, the
applicant's license would be subject to suspension by the Board on
its own findings, through newly available information from an outside source, or upon the request of any one of the three sponsors for
cause shown.
The strength of this proposal is that it serves as a more realistic
final screen for the protection of the bar and the public without
discriminatory treatment of recent arrivals. The state would be better
able to detect character deficiency by on-the-job observation of its
bar applicants. The applicants would immediately be able to practice
law at full salary.
How would the new rule fare under constitutional challenge? It is
reasonable to expect the Supreme Court to reverse and remand
Suffling with instructions to the district court panel to apply the
Shapiro test since deciding in Blumstein that "durational residence
laws must be measured by a strict equal protection test."' 9 For the
same reason that Rule II(A)(8) will be subjected to the more
stringent test, the proposed rule must also hold up under that
measure. The fatal defect of Rule II(A)(8) is the Board of Bar
Examiners' actual inactivity in checking a candidate's character after
the bar examination. Under the third alternative this flaw is
remedied. New Mexico's compromise residence rule would survive
because it is "tailored" with "precision" to promote the compelling
state interest of licensing only capable attorneys.
V. HENRY ROTHSCHILD III

59. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4273 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).

